Abstract: In this paper, we propose a multi-input stochastic extremum seeking algorithm to solve Nash equilibrium seeking for a noncooperative game whose N players seek to maximize their general nonlinear payoff functions. Our algorithm is a non-model based approach for asymptotic, locally stable attainment of the Nash equilibria in probability. Different from classical game theory algorithms, where each player employs the knowledge of the functional form of his payoff and the knowledge of the other players's actions, a player employing our algorithm measures only his own payoff values, without knowing the functional form of his or other players' payoff functions. For the general nonlinear payoffs, the convergence is not perfect but is biased in proportion to the third derivatives of the payoff functions and is dependent on the intensity of stochastic perturbation. We quantify the size of these residual biases. Compared to the deterministic extremum seeking with sinusoidal perturbation signals, the advantage of our algorithm lies in that each player independently employs his seeking strategy by choosing an ergodic stochastic probing signal and there is no requirement on different frequencies for different players.
INTRODUCTION
Seeking Nash equilibria in continuous games is a difficult problem (Kubica et al. [2010] ). Researchers in different fields, including mathematics, computer science, economics, and system engineering, have interest and need for techniques for finding Nash equilibria. Most algorithms designed to achieve convergence to Nash equilibria require modeling information for the game and assume that the players can observe the actions of the other players. The first serious algorithm perhaps is Rosen [1965] , in which a gradient-type algorithm is studied for convex games. Distributed iterative algorithms are designed for the computation of equilibrium in Li and Başar [1987] for a general class of non-quadratic convex Nash games. In this algorithm, the agents do not have to know each other's cost functionals and private information, as well as the parameters and subjective probability distributions adopted by the others, but they have to communicate to each other their tentative decisions during each phase of computation. A strategy known as fictitious play is one such strategy that depends on the actions of the other players so that a player can devise a best response. A dynamic version of fictitious play and gradient response is developed in Shamma and Arslan [2005] . In Zhu and Martinez [2010] , a synchronous distributed learning algorithm is designed to the coverage optimization of mobile visual sensor networks. In this algorithm, players remember their own actions and utility values from the previous two times steps, and the algorithm is shown to converge in probability to the set of restricted Nash equilibria. Other diverse engineering applications of game theory include the design of communication networks in Mackenzie and Wicker [2001] , Altman et al. [2002] , Başar [2007] , Scutari et al. [2009] , integrated structures and controls in Rao et al. [1988] , and distributed consensus protocols in Bauso et al. [2008] , Marden et al. [2009] , Semsar-Kazerooni and Khorasani [2009] . A comprehensive treatment of static and dynamic noncooperative game theory can be found in Başar and Olsder [1999] .
Extremum seeking is a non-model based real-time optimization approach for dynamic problems where only limited knowledge of a system is available. Since the emergence of a proof of its stability (Krstić and Wang [2000] ), extremum seeking has been an active research area both in applications (King et al. [2006] , Li et al. [2005] , Luo and Schuster [2009] , Moase et al. [2009a,b] , Wehner and Schuster [2009] ) and in further theoretical developments (Ariyur and Krstić [2003] , Choi et al. [2002] , Stanković and Stipanović [2009a,b] , Tan et al. [2006] ). Based on the extremum seeking approach with sinusoidal perturbations, in Krstić et al. [2010] , Nash equilibrium seeking is studied for noncooperative games with both finitely and infinitely many players. In Stanković et al. [2010] , Nash games in mobile sensor networks are solved using extremum seeking. Owing to certain advantages of stochastic perturbations over the sinusoidal ones, in Liu and Krstić [2010a,b] , we investigated the stochastic extremum seeking algorithm for the single perturbation input case.
In this work, a multi-input stochastic extremum seeking algorithm is developed for finding Nash equilibria in N-player noncooperative games. First, to analyze the convergence of the algorithm, a multi-input stochastic averaging theory is developed. For an N-player noncooperative game, each player employs independently stochastic extremum seeking to attain a Nash equilibrium. Similar to the deterministic case (Frihauf et al. [2010] ), the key feature of our approach is that the players are not required to know the mathematical model of their payoff function or the underlying model of the game. The players only need to measure their own payoff values. It is proved that under certain conditions, the actions of players can converge to a neighborhood of a Nash equilibrium. The convergence result is local in the sense that convergence to any particular Nash equilibrium is assured only for initial conditions in a set around that specific stable Nash equilibrium. Moreover, convergence to a Nash equilibrium is biased in proportion to the third derivatives of the payoff functions and is dependent on the intensity of stochastic perturbation. Compared to the deterministic case, one advantage of stochastic extremum seeking is that there is no need to choose different perturbation frequencies for each player and each player only need choose its own perturbation process independently, which is more realistic in a practical game with adversarial players.
The paper is organized as follows: we introduce our general problem formulation in Section 2, state our algorithm and convergence results in Section 3, and present the convergence proof in Section 4. Finally, we provide a numerical example for a two-player game in Section 5 and state our stochastic averaging theory for the multi-input case in the Appendix.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an N-player noncooperative game where each player wishes to maximize its payoff function of the general nonlinear form. Assume the payoff function of player i is of the form
where u i is player i's action, the action (strategy) space is the whole space R,
represents the actions of the other players, h i : R N → R is smooth, and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Our algorithm is based on the following assumptions. Assumption 2.1. There exists at least one, possibly multiple, isolated stable Nash equilibrium
is diagonally dominant and hence, nonsingular.
By Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, Ξ is Hurwitz.
. Stochastic extremum seeking scheme for a two-player noncooperative game
In our scheme, player i has no knowledge of others players' payoff h j , j = i and actions u j ( j = i). It can only measure its own payoff h i . Our objective is to design a stochastic extremum seeking algorithm for each player to approximate Nash equilibrium.
STOCHASTIC NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING ALGORITHM
In our algorithm, each player independently employs a stochastic seeking strategy to attain the stable Nash equilibrium of the game. Player i implements the following strategy:
where for any i = 1, . . . , N, a i > 0 is the perturbation amplitude, k i > 0 is the adaptive gain, J i (t) is the measured payoff value for player i, and f i is a bounded smooth function that player i chooses, e.g., a sine function. η i (t), i = 1, . . . , N are independent ergodic processes chosen by player i, e.g., the OrnsteinUhlenbeck (OU) process
q i > 0, ε i are small parameters satisfying 0 < max i ε i < ε 0 for fixed ε 0 > 0, and W i (t), i = 1, . . . , N are independent 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a complete probability space (Ω, F , P) with the sample space Ω, σ -field F , probability measure P. To analyze the convergence of the algorithm, we denote the error relative to the Nash equilibrium asũ i (t) =û i (t) − u * i . Then, we obtain an error system aṡ
. If the players choose f i (x) = sin x for all i = 1, . . . , N, and η i as OU processes (7), we have the following convergence result. Theorem 3.1. Consider the error system (8) for an N-player game under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. Then there exists a constant a * > 0 such that for max 1≤i≤N a i ∈ (0, a * ) there exist constants r > 0, c > 0, γ > 0 and a function T (ε 1 ) : (0, ε 0 ) → N such that for any initial condition |Λ ε 1 (0)| < r, and any δ > 0,
(9) and
. . .
and
PROOF OF THE ALGORITHM CONVERGENCE
We apply the multi-input stochastic averaging theory presented in the Appendix to analyze the error system (8). First, we calculate the average system of (8).
Define χ j (t) = η j (ε j t) and B j (t) =
Thus we can rewrite the error system aṡ
Denote ε i = ε 1 c i , i = 2, · · · , N for some positive real constants c i 's and consider the change of variable Z 1 (t) = χ 1 (t), Z 2 (t) = χ 2 (c 2 t), . . . , Z N (t) = χ(c N t). Then the error system (12) can be transformed as one with single small parameter ε 1 :
By (A.4), we have the following average error systeṁ
where a −i sin(x −i ) = [a 1 sin(x 1 ), . . ., a i−1 sin(x i−1 ), a i+1 sin(x i+1 ), . . ., a N sin(x N )], and µ i is the invariant measure of the process (χ i (t),t ≥ 0) or (Z i (t),t ≥ 0).
The equilibriumũ e = [ũ e 1 , . . . ,ũ e N ] of (14) satisfies
To calculate the equilibrium of the average error system and analyze its stability, we postulate thatũ e has the form
By expanding h i about u * in (15) 
where v i =ũ e i + a i sin(x i ) and v −i =ũ e −i + a −i sin(x −i )). Although for any i = 1, . . . , N, h i may not have its Taylor series expansion only by its smoothness, here we just give the form of Taylor series expansion. In fact, we only need its third order Taylor formula.
Since the invariant measure
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Based on the above calculations, substituting (17) into (15) and computing the average of each term gives
Substituting (16) into (18) and matching first order powers of
. . , N, which implies that b i j = 0 for all i, j since Ξ is nonsingular by Assumption 2.2. Similarly, matching second order terms a j a k ( j > k) and a 2 j of a j , and substituting b i j = 0 to simplify the resulting expressions,
Thus, d i jk = 0 for all i, j, k when j = k, and d i j j is given by (11). Therefore, the equilibrium of the average error system (14) is
By the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we obtain that the Jacobian Ψ ave = (ψ i j ) N×N of the average error system (14) at u e has elements given by
and is Hurwitz by Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 for sufficiently small a i , which implies that the equilibrium (20) of the average error system (14) is exponentially stable. By the multi-input averaging theorem in the Appendix, the theorem is proved.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We consider two players with payoff functions
which yield two Nash equilibria:
4 ). The corresponding matrices are Ξ 1 = −1 2 2 −2 and Ξ 2 = −7 2 6 −2 , where Ξ 1 is nonsingular but not Hurwitz, while Ξ 2 is nonsingular and Hurwitz, and both matrices are not diagonally dominant. (u * 2 1 , u * 2 2 ) is a stable Nash equilibrium and we employ the above algorithm to attain this equilibrium.
The average error system for this game iṡ
where u * 1 can be u * 1 1 or u * 2 1 . The equilibria (ũ e 1 ,ũ e 2 ) of this average system arẽ
and their postulated form is
The corresponding Jacobian matrix is
where γ i = k i a 2 i G 0 (q i ), i = 1, 2, and its characteristic equation is given by, λ 2 +α 1 λ +α 2 = 0, where α 1 = (6ũ e 1 +6u * 1 −2)γ 1 + 2γ 2 , α 2 = (2ũ e 1 + u * 1 − 1)4γ 1 γ 2 . Thus Ψ ave is Hurwitz if and only if α 1 and α 2 are positive. For sufficiently small a 1 , which makes u e ≈ (0, 0), α 1 and α 2 are positive for u * 1 = 3 2 but for u * 1 = 1 2 , α 2 is not positive, which is reasonable because Ξ 1 is not Hurwitz but Ξ 2 is Hurwitz.
The top picture in Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the game in theũ plane, initialized at the point (u 1 (0), u 2 (0)) = (0, 3), i.e., at (ũ 1 (0),ũ 2 (0)) = (−1.5, 0.75). The parameters are chosen as k 1 = 14, k 2 = 6, a 1 = 0.2, a 2 = 0.02, ε 1 = 0.01, ε 2 = 0.8. The bottom two pictures depict the two players' actions of stochastic seeking Nash equilibrium (u * 1 , u * 2 ) = (1.5, 2.25). From Figure 2 , the actions of the players converge to a small neighborhood of the stable Nash equilibrium.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a multi-input stochastic extremum seeking algorithm to solve the problem of seeking Nash equilibria for an N-player nonoperative game. In our algorithm, each player independently employs his seeking strategy using only the value of his own payoff but without any information about the form of his payoff function and other players' actions. Our convergence result is local and the convergence error is in proportion to the third derivatives of the payoff functions and is dependent on the intensity of stochastic perturbation. The advantage of our stochastic algorithm over the deterministic ones lies in that there is no requirement on different frequencies of the perturbation signal for different players.
